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I. Elliptic Curves Cryptography
I.1. Public Key Cryptography
1. Key exchange : two parties or more agree on a common secret using only publicly ex-
changed information
2. Signature schemes : allows parties to authenticate themselves
3. Encryption : preserve confidentiality of data
Example I.1. RSA, Diffie-Hellman, ECDH, DSA, ECDSA
I.2. Applications
• Secure browser sessions (https: SSL/TLS)
• Signed, encrypted email (S/MIME)
• Virtual private networking (IPSec)
• Authentication (X.509 certificates)
• . . .
I.3. Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
Two parties Alice and Bob intend to share a secret value
• They agree on a common cyclic group G generated by g.
• Alice (resp. Bob) picks a random value a (resp. b) and sends ga (resp gb) to Bob (resp.
Alice).
• Upon receiving gb (resp. ga), Alice (resp. Bob) computes the secret value k = (gb)a (resp.
k′ = (ga)b )
The shared key k = k′ can be then used as a session key for symetric encryption.
I.4. Problems
• Public key operations are computationally expensive compared to symmetric key (block
ciphers, stream ciphers, AES)
• Public keys can be long: currently in use 2048-bit RSA up to 16,000-bit keys
• Issues of power, bandwidth, and time
Notes de cours donne´ au 4e`me atelier annuel sur la CRyptographie, Alge`bre et Ge´ome´trie (CRAG-4), 21 - 25 Juillet
2014, Universite´ de Dschang, Dschang, Cameroun / Lecture notes given at the 4th annual workshop on CRyptography,
Algebra and Geometry (CRAG-4), 21- 25 July 2014, University of Dschang, Dschang, Cameroon.
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Figure 1. An elliptic curve over R
I.5. Elliptic Curve Cryptography
• Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is an alternative to RSA and Diffie-Hellman, primarily
signatures and key exchange
• Proposed in 1985 (vs. 1975 for RSA)
• Security is based on a hard mathematical problem different than factoring : ECDLP
• Pairing-based cryptography currently entirely on pairings on elliptic curves
I.6. Elliptic Curves
An elliptic curve E over a field K can be described as the subset of K × K satisfying the
equation
y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6
for a given a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6 ∈ K, along with another special point ”at infinity” O. An
additional demand is that the curve be ”smooth”, which means that the partial derivatives of
the curve has no common zeros. This can be reduced to checking that some invariant value ∆
(the discriminant of the curve) which is calculated from the coefficients is not zero
Depending on the characteristic of K, the above equation can be simplified. There are
three cases to consider:
1. When char(K) 6= 2, 3 the equation can be simplified to y2 = x3 + ax+ b with a, b ∈ K.
2. When char(K) = 2 and a1 6= 0, the equation can be simplified to y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b
with a, b ∈ K. This curve is said to be non-supersingular. If a1 = 0, the equation can be
simplified to y2 + cy = x3 + ax+ b with a, b, c ∈ K. This curve is said to be supersingular.
3. When char(K) = 3 and a21 6= −a2, the equation can be simplified to y2 = x3 + ax2 + b
with a, b ∈ K. This curve is said to be non-supersingular. If a21 = −a2, the equation can
be simplified to y2 = x3 + ax+ b with a, b ∈ K. This curve is said to be supersingular.
I.6.1. Group law on an elliptic curve.
I.6.2. Another group for DLP : Jacobian of hyperelliptic curves.
• For genus 2, affine model of curve
C : y2 = f(x), deg(f) = 5 or 6
• Elements of the Jacobian J(C) represented by pairs of points on C
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Figure 2. Addition of two points
Figure 3. Doubling a point
• Mumford representation for elements
• Efficient group law: Cantor’s algorithm
I.6.3. NIST Recommendations.
I.6.4. Affine vs. Projective coordinates.
• Projective coordinates allow group law computation on E without field inversions, at the
cost of more multiplies
• Roughly 16 field multiplies to compute 2P
• Better than affine if field inversions are very expensive
• e.g. for NIST prime curves, some estimate 1 inversion ∼ 80 multiplies
Imhotep Proc.
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Figure 4. An elliptic curve over R
I.6.5. ECDSA.
• Parameters : Fq, E(Fq), G a point of order r
• Setup :
– Private key : an integer a ∈ [1, r − 1]
– Public key : A = aG
• To sign a message, Alice
– chooses a random integer k ≤ r − 1, computes K = kG, t = XK mod r and s =
(m+ at)k−1 mod r
– sends m, t, s to Bob.
• To verify the signature, Bob computes P = s−1(mG+ tA) and tests if XP = t
I.6.6. Pairings in Cryptography. Let H1 and H2 be finite additive abelian groups, and H3 be
a multiplicative finite group. A cryptographic pairing is a bilinear map
e : H1 ×H2 −→ H3
with the above properties:
1. Non-Degeneracy: ∀ 0 6= R ∈ H1, ∃ S ∈ H2 with e(R,S) 6= 1, and ∀ 0 6= S ∈ H2, ∃ R ∈ H1
with e(R,S) 6= 1
2. Bilinearity : ∀ R1, R2 ∈ H1 and ∀ S1, S2 ∈ H2,
e(R1, S1)e(R2, S1) = e(R1 +R2, S1)
e(R1, S1)e(R1, S2) = e(R1, S1 + S2)
3. Efficiently computable
Properties of Bilinear Pairings
1. e(R,O) = e(O,S) = 1
2. e(−R,S) = e(R,S)−1 = e(R,S)−1
3. e([a]R,S) = e(R,S)a = e(R, [a]S)
4. e([a]R, [b]S) = e(R,S)ab, for all a, b ∈ Z
Imhotep Proc.
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Figure 5. Tripartite Diffie-Hellman key exchange
I.6.7. Pairings on Elliptic Curves. For our purposes, we will use the following:
• Let E be an elliptic curve defined over Fq.
• Let P be a fixed point on E of prime order n.
• Let k be the order of q mod n. Then k is also the smallest integer such that n|(qk − 1). k
is called the embedding degree.
Pairings will be of the form
e : 〈P 〉 × 〈P 〉 −→ µn ⊆ F∗qk
• Weil pairing on elliptic curves
• Tate pairing on elliptic curves
• Squared Weil and Tate pairings
• Optimal Ate pairing
• Eta pairing and generalized forms
I.6.8. Cryptographic Applications.
• MOV attack transfers the discrete logarithm problem on E to a discrete logarithm in Fqk .
• Identity based encryption (IBE) : Public key encryption system where the users public
key is based on his own identity, i.e. an email address.
• Short signatures : Signature schemes with signatures half the length of other signature
schemes.
• Key exchange : A tripartite key exchange can be done in one round.
• ABE (attribute-based encryption), PEKS (Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search),
Homomorphic encryption, ...
• Identity based signatures, Identity based key exchange ...
Key Exchanges
1. Alice sends [a]P to Bob and Chris
2. Bob sends [b]P to Alice and Chris
3. Chris sends [c]P to Alice and Bob
4. Alice can compute the key e([b]P, [c]P )a = e(P, P )abc
Security
• For the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, security is based on the CDH problem:
Imhotep Proc.
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Figure 6. Tripartite Diffie-Hellman key exchange
Given P , [a]P , and [b]P , compute [ab]P .
• For Joux’s tripartite exchange, security is based on the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH)
problem:
Given P , [a]P , [b]P , and [c]P , compute e(P, P )abc.
• Clearly, if one can solve the discrete log problem, then one can solve the Diffie-Hellman
problem.
• Anyone who can solve the Diffie-Hellman problem can solve the bilinear Diffie-Hellman
problem.
Short Signatures : Boneh, Lynn, and Schacham
• Parameters : E, e, P ∈ E and a hash function H : {0, 1}m −→ 〈P 〉
• Setup
– Private key is a secret integer r
– Public key is R = [r]P
• To sign a message M , Alice computes S = [r]H(M)
• To verify the signature, check if e(P, S) = e(P, [r]H(M)) = e([r]P,H(M)) = e(R,H(M)).
To forge a signature on M , need to be able to find r, given P , R, and H(M), which is a
Diffie-Hellman problem in 〈P 〉.
II. Hashing into elliptic curves
II.0.9. Hashing into elliptic curves. A hash function into an elliptic curve E defined over a
finite field Fq is a map
f : Fq −→ E(Fq)
Use of hash functions
• Some elliptic curve cryptosystems require to hash into an elliptic curve, for
• Boneh-Franklin identity based encryption scheme
• Password based authentication protocols : SPEKE (Simple Password Key Exchange), PAK
(Password Authenticated Key Exchange)
Let E be an elliptic curve defined over Fq, (q = pn) where p > 3 by a Weierstrass
equation
y2 = x3 + ax+ b,
where a, b ∈ Fpn
’Try-and-Increment’ Method. Input : u an integer
Output : Q, a point of E(Fq), (q = p)
• For i = 0 to k − 1
(a) Set x = u+ i
(b) If x3 + ax+ b is a quadratic residue in Fq, then return Q = (x, (x3 + ax+ b)1/2)
• end For
Imhotep Proc.
Vol. 2, No.1 (2015) Trends in Elliptic Curves Cryptography 7
Supersingular Curves
• A curve E is called supersingular when N = q + 1.
• When q 6= 1 mod 3, the map x 7−→ x3 is a bijection, therefore the curves of equations
y2 = x3 + b
are supersingular.
• On can define the encoding
f : u 7−→ ((u2 − b)1/3, u)
• However, the discrete logarithm on these curves is much easier than for ordinary curves.
Indeed, such curves have an efficient computable pairing which enables to map the discrete
logarithm problem onto a finite field; this is the MOV attack
The Shallue-Woestijne Algorith (2006) Let f(x) = x3 + ax+ b. The algorithm is based
on the Skalba’s equality : there exists four maps X1(t), X2(t), X3(t), X4(t) such that
f(X1(t)) · f(X2(t)) · f(X3(t)) = X4(t)2.
Then in a finite field, for a fixed parameter t, at least one of the f(Xi(t)) must be a quadratic
residue, which implies that this Xi(t) is an abscissa of a point of the elliptic curve y
2 = f(x).
Icart’s function (2009)
Let Ea,b be an elliptic curve defined over the finite field Fq, with q ≡ 2 mod 3, p = char(Fq) ≥ 5,
given by the Weierstrass equation
y2 = x3 + ax+ b.
Let E(Fq) denote the set of Fq-rational points on Ea,b, including the point at infinity O.
fa,b : F∗q −→ Ea,b(Fq)
u 7−→ (x, y)
where
x =
(
v2 − b− u
2
27
)1/3
+
u2
3
and y = ux+ v,
with
v =
3a− u4
6u
,
and f(u) = O if u = 0.
Theorem II.1. Let Fq be a finite field where q ≡ 2 mod 3. For any u ∈ Fq, fa,b(u) is a point of
Ea,b(Fq) : y2 = x3 + ax+ b
Proof. For u 6= 0, let (x, y) = fa,b(u). From the definition of x(
x− u
2
3
)
= v2 − b− u
6
27
This expands to
x3 − u2x2 + u
4
3
x+ b− v = 0
Since u4/3 = a− 2uv, this can be rewritten into
x3 − u2x2 + (a− 2uv)x+ b− v2 = 0
which leads to
x2 + ax+ b = u2x2 + 2uxv + v2 = (ux+ v)2
and finally x2 + ax+ b = y2
Imhotep Proc.
8 Abdoul Aziz Ciss

Properties of Icart’s function
Theorem II.2. The function fa,b can be implemented in deterministic polynomial time, with
O(log3 q) running time and a constant number of operations over Fq.
Theorem II.3. Let P = (x, y) be a point on the curve Ea,b. The solutions us of fa,b(us) = P
are the solutions of the polynomial equation
u4 − 6u2x+ 6uy − 3a = 0
Theorem II.4. f−1a,b (P ) is computable in polynomial time and |f−1a,b (P )| ≤ 4, for all P ∈ Ea,b
The binary case
Let Ea,b be an elliptic curve over the finite field F2n given by the Weierstrass equation
y2xy = x3 + ax2 + b.
For an odd n, the map x 7−→ x3 is a bijection. Let
fa,b : F∗2n −→ Ea,b(F2n)
u 7−→ (x, ux+ v2)
where
u = a+ u+ u2 and x = (v4 + v3 + b)1/3 + v.
Theorem II.5. Let F2n be a field with n odd. For any u ∈ F2n , fa,b(u) is a point of Ea,b :
y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b
Proof. Given a parameter u, let (x, y) be fa,b(u). We have the following equations for
x, u and v.
0 = (x+ v)3 + b+ v3 + v4
= x3 + vx2 + v2x+ b+ v4
Since v = a+ u+ u2, this can be rewritten into
x3 + ax2 + b = ux2 + u2x2 + v2x+ v4
= (ux+ v2)((u+ 1)x+ v2) = y(x+ y)
Hence, (x, y) = fa,b(u) is a point on Ea,b

Hashing into Hessian elliptic curves (Farashahi 2011) A Hessian curve Hd over a finite
field Fq is given by the equation
Hd : x
3 + y3 + 1 = 3dxy,
where d ∈ Fq and d3 6= 1.
For q ≡ 2 mod 3, the Hessian curve Hd has one Fq point at infinity O which is the
neutral element of the group. For an affine point P of Hd, the x-coordinate of P is denoted by
x(P ).
For q ≡ 2 mod 3, consider the map
hd : Fq −→ Hd(Fq)
defined by hd(u) = (x, y) if u 6= −1, where
x = −u
(
d3u3 + 1
u3 + 1
)1/3
, y = −
(
d3u3 + 1
u3 + 1
)1/3
+ du
and hd(u) = O if u = −1.
Imhotep Proc.
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Theorem II.6. For a point P = (x, y) ∈ Hd(Fq), we have P ∈ hd(Fq) if and only if there exists
an element u ∈ Fq satisfying the equation
du2 − uy + x = 0
Hashing into Edwards curves : Elligator (Bernstein et. al 2013)
Let Ed be an Edwards curve defined over Fq by
x2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2,
with d 6= 0, 1 is not a square. Define the quadratic character
χ : Fq −→ Fq, a 7−→ a(q−1)/2
If a is a non-zero square, then χ(a) = 1; if a is a non-square, then χ(a) = −1; if a = 0, then
χ(a) = 0
Theorem II.7. Let q be a prime power congruent to 3 modulo 4. Let s be a nonzero element of
Fq with (s2− 2)(s2 + 2) 6= 0. Define c = 2/s2. Then c(c− 1)(c+ 1) 6= 0. Define r = c+ 1/c and
d = −(c + 1)2/(c − 1)2. Then, r 6= 0, and d is not a square. The following elements of Fq are
defined for each t ∈ Fq − {±1} :
u = (1− t)/(1 + t), v = u5 + (r2 − 2)u3 + u
X = χ(v)u, Y = (χ(v)v)(q+1)/4χ(v)χ(u2 + 1/c2)
x = (c− 1)aX(1 +X)/Y, y = (rX − (1 +X2))/(rX + (1 +X2))
Furthermore x2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2
III. Randomness Extractors
III.1. Diffie-Hellman key exchange
Two parties A and B want to share a common secret
• They agree on a group G and a generator g ∈ G.
• They choose respectively two integers a and b, with a, b < o(g).
• A computes ga and sends it to B. By de same way, B computes gb and sends it to A.
• Finally, A computes k = (gb)a; B computes k′ = (ga)b
The shared key k = k′ can be then used as a session key for symetric encryption ???
III.2. Dual Elliptic Curve Pseudorandom Generator
Algorithm 1 DECRNG
Require: s0 < #E(Fp), P,Q ∈ E(Fp), k > 0
1: for (i = 1; i ≤ k ; i+ +) do
2: set si ← x(si−iP )
3: set ri ← L240(x(siQ))
4: end for
5: return r1, r2, . . . , rk
where Li(s) = s mod 2
i, for s ∈ Z et i > 0
Imhotep Proc.
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III.3. Randomness Extractor
Definition III.1. A randomness extractor for a group G is a function which convert a random
element of G to a uniformly random bit-string of fixed length.
Example III.2. • Key derivation
• Encryption, signatures
• Construction of cryptographically secure pseudorandom numbers generator
• Error correcting codes
Definition III.3. Statistical distance Let X and Y be tow random variables on a finite set
S. The statistical distance ∆(X,Y ) between X and Y is defined as
∆(X,Y ) =
1
2
∑
s∈S
|Pr[X = s]− Pr[Y = s]| .
Definition III.4. Let S and T be two finite sets and let Ext be a function Ext : S −→ T . Ext
is said to be a deterministic (T, δ)-extractor for S if the random variable Ext(US) is δ-uniform
over T . In other words,
∆(Ext(US), UT ) ≤ δ.
Definition III.5. Let R, S and T be finite sets. The function Ext : R × S −→ T is a two-
sources-extractor if the distribution Ext(X1, X2) is δ-close to the uniform distribution UT for
every uniformly distributed random variables X1 in R and X2 in S
Previous works : E(Fp), Chevalier et. al (2009)
Let E be an elliptic curve defined over a finite field Fp, for a prime p > 2. Let G be a subgroup
of E(Fp) and let k be a positive integer. Define the function
Lk : G −→ {0, 1}k
P 7−→ lsbk(x(P ))
Theorem III.6. Let p be a n-bit prime, G a subgroup of E(Fp) of cardinal q generated by a point
P0, q being an l-bit prime, UG a random variable uniformly distributed in G and k a positive
integer. Then
∆(Lk(UG), Uk) ≤ 2(k+n+log2(n))/2+3−l,
where Uk is the uniform distribution in {0, 1}k.
Previous works : E(Fp), Chevalier et. al (2009)
Corollary III.7. Let e be a positive integer and suppose that
k ≤ 2l − (n+ 2e+ log2(n) + 6).
Then Lk is a (UG, 2−e)-deterministic extractor
Previous works : E(Fpn), Ciss et. al (2011) Consider now the finite field Fpn ,
where p > 5 is prime and n is a positive integer. Then Fpn is a n-dimensional vector space over
Fp. Let {α1, α2, . . . , αn} be a basis of Fpn over Fp. Let E be the elliptic curve over Fpn defined
by the Weierstrass equation
y2 + (a1x+ a3)y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6.
Definition III.8. Let G be a subgroup of E(Fpn) and k a positive integer less than n.
Dk : G −→ Fkp
P = (x, y) 7−→ (x1, x2, . . . , xk)
where x ∈ Fpn is written as x = x1α1 + x2α2 + . . .+ xnαn, and xi ∈ Fp.
Imhotep Proc.
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Previous works : E(Fpn), Ciss et. al (2011)
Theorem III.9. Let E be an elliptic curve defined over Fq, whit q = pn and let G be a subgroup
of E(Fpn). Let Dk be the function defined above. Then,
Col(Dk(UG) ≤ 1
pk
+
4
√
q
|G|2
and
∆(Dk(UG), UF
pk
) ≤ 2
√
pn+k
|G|
where UG is uniformly distributed in G and UF
pk
is the uniform distribution in Fpk .
Theorem III.10. Let p > 2 be a prime and E(Fpn) be an elliptic curve over Fpn and G ⊂ E(Fpn)
be a multiplicative subgroup of order r with |r| = t and |p| = m and let UG be the uniform
distribution in G. If e > 1 is an integer and k > 1 is an integer such that
k ≤ 2t− 2e− nm− 4
m
,
then Dk is a (Fkp, 2−e)-deterministic randomness extractor for the elliptic curve E(Fpn).
III.4. New Results
Definition III.11. 2-source randomness extractors for E(Fp) Let E be an elliptic curve
defined a finite field Fq, with q = p a prime greater than 5, and let P and Q be two subgroups
of E(Fq) with #P = r and #Q = t. Define the function
Ext1 : P ×Q −→ {0, 1}k
(P,Q) 7−→ lsbk(x(P ⊕Q))
Theorem III.12. Let E be an elliptic curve defined over Fp and let P and Q be two subgroups of
E(Fp), with #P = r and #Q = t. Let UP and UQ be two random variables uniformly distributed
in P and Q respectively and let Uk be the uniform distribution in {0, 1}k. Then,
∆(Ext1(UP , UQ), Uk)
√
2k−1p log(p)
rt
Corollary III.13. Let m and l be the bit size of r and t respectively and let e be a positive integer.
If k is a positive integer such that
k ≤ m+ l − (n+ 2e+ log2(n) + 1),
then Ext1 is a (k,O(2
−e))-deterministic extractor for P ×Q.
2-source randomness extractors for E(Fpn), with p > 5
Definition III.14. Let E be an elliptic curve defined over the finite field Fpn , where p is a prime
greater than 5 and n > 1. Consider two subgroups P and Q of E(Fq). Define the function
Ext2 : P ×Q −→ Fkp
(P,Q) 7−→ (x1, x2, . . . , xk)
where x(P ⊕ Q) = (x1, x2, . . . , xk, xk+1, . . . , xn). In other words, the function Ext2 output the
k first Fp-coefficients of the abscissa of the point P ⊕Q.
Theorem III.15. Let E be an elliptic curve defined over Fpn and let P and Q be two subgroup
of E(Fpn) with #P = r and #Q = t. Denote by UP and UQ two random variables uniformly
distributed on P and Q respectively. Then,
∆(Ext2(UP , UQ), UFkp )
√
pn+k
4rt
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III.5. Some open problems
1. Generalization of Ext1 and Ext2
Ext1 : P1 × P2 × . . .× Ps −→ {0, 1}k
(P1, P2, . . . , Ps) 7−→ lsbk(x(P1 ⊕ P2 ⊕ . . .⊕ Ps))
Ext2 : P1 × P2 × . . .× Ps −→ Fkp
(P1, P2, . . . , Ps) 7−→ Dk(x(P1 ⊕ P2 ⊕ . . .⊕ Ps))
2. Construct good pseudorandom numbers generators with Ext1 and Ext2
3. The case of hyperelliptic curves
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